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The dual life of embedded CPs:
Evidence from Russian čto-clauses*
Tatiana Bondarenko
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract With the data from clauses with the complementizer čto in Russian, I
argue that embedded finite clauses with the same morphosyntactic appearance can
receive two different denotations depending on the argument that they modify. I
show that čto-clauses can combine with both nouns like mysl’ ‘thought’ and nouns
like situacija ‘situation’, and that they do not have the same interpretation in these
two cases. I propose that when čto-clauses combine with predicates of contentful
individuals (like mysl’ ‘thought’), they describe the propositional content that these
individuals have (Moltmann 1989, Kratzer 2006, Moulton 2015, a.o.). However
when they combine with predicates of situations (like situacija ‘situation’), they
provide the proposition that these situations exemplify. I furthermore show that the
two meanings of čto-clauses can be detected when they occur with verbs as well,
and sketch out a more decompositional view of how the two interpretations arise
based on comparison with -(n)un-clauses that modify nouns in Korean.
Keywords: clausal embedding, attitude reports, Russian, Korean, situation semantics
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the question of what kinds of objects we find in the
denotations of finite embedded clauses. For example, here are some candidates that
we might consider as the meaning of the clause that the squirrels ate the nuts:
(1) Jthat the squirrels ate the nutsK = ?
a. {s : the squirrels ate the nuts in s}
b. {s : s is a minimal situation of the squirrels eating the nuts}
c. {x : Content(x) = {s’ : the squirrels ate the nuts in s’}}
* I am indebted to my Russian consultants, especially to Misha Berežkov, Lena Delikanova, Nastya
Gruzdeva, Anton Kukhto, Mitya Privoznov, and Nadya Voronova, and to Eunsun Jou for Korean
judgements. I am very grateful for helpful discussions to Patrick Elliott, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox,
Sabine Iatridou, Florian Schwarz, Roger Schwarzschild, participants of LFRG at MIT and SALT 31
at Brown University, and to the anonymous reviewers of SALT. All errors are my own.
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The dual life of embedded CPs
In (1a) the meaning of the CP is the set of situations (of all sizes) in which the
squirrels ate the nuts. (1b) hypothesizes that the denotation of the CP is the set of
minimal situations of the squirrels eating the nuts, and (1c) proposes to view it as a
set of objects with propositional content (Moltmann 1989, Kratzer 2006, Moulton
2015, a.o.) whose content is equated with the embedded proposition.
In this paper I search for empirical reasons to choose between the options in
(1a)-(1c), and argue that finite embedded clauses can have denotations both like in
(1b) and like in (1c). Evidence for this view will come from looking at Russian
finite embedded clauses with the complementizer čto. These clauses are the basic



















‘I think /know /remember that squirrels ate all the nuts.’
But in addition to verbs, čto-clauses can combine with at least two types of nouns,
and those kinds of sentences will be the focus of this paper. The first type of
nouns that čto-clauses can combine with are content nouns like mysl’ ‘thought’
or ideja ‘idea’ (henceforth Cont-DPs), (3): these nouns denote entities that have
some propositional content associated with them. The second type are what I will
call situation nouns (henceforth Sit-DPs)—nouns like situacija ‘situation’ or slučaj










































‘Last week there was an event of squirrels eating all the nuts.’
As we can see, the CPs in (3) and (4) look morphosyntactically the same (and also
identical to the CP in (2)), however we will see that their meaning is not identical.
Embedded clauses that combine with Cont-DPs (henceforth Cont-CPs) have
been discussed quite extensively in the literature (Stowell 1981; Moltmann 1989;
Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2009; Moltmann 2013, 2014; Moulton 2015; Kratzer 2016;
Elliott 2016, 2017; Moltmann 2020; Roberts 2020; Srinivas & Legendre 2020),
often in the process of arguing for semantics like in (1c). Clauses that combine with
Sit-DPs (henceforth Sit-CPs) received almost no attention in the literature, with the
notable exception of Moltmann (2021) discussing the semantics of constructions
with the noun ‘case’. She argues that NPs like case quantify over situations that are
truthmakers of the CP, which is similar to what I propose about CPs with Sit-DPs.
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In this paper I adopt the situation semantics framework (Barwise 1981; Kratzer
1989, 2002, 2020), and argue that embedded finite clauses are predicates whose
meaning depends on the argument that they modify (5): if their argument x has
content, the CP will describe it; but if x is a situation without content, then the CP
will describe what kind of a situation it is.
(5) Jthat squirrels ateK =
λx.

Cont(x) = {s’: squirrels ate in s’} x has Content
x is a minimal squirrel-eating situation x ∈ Ds ∧ has no Content
undefined otherwise
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 argues for viewing Russian čto-clauses
that combine with nouns as modifiers. Section 3 shows that the denotation of čto-
clauses when they combine with Cont-DPs cannot be identical to their denotation
when they combine with Sit-DPs. In section 4 I present my proposal and discuss
how it captures the properties of čto-clauses. Section 5 argues that the same two
meanings of čto-clauses that we observe with nouns also exist when these clauses
combine with verbs. Section 6 addresses the question of whether the meaning for
the complementizer that I provide can be decomposed into several distinct pieces,
and suggests that the answer is positive based on comparison of Russian čto-clauses
to Korean clauses with the adnominal marker -(n)un. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Embedded čto-clauses are modifiers
There are at least three reasons to think that čto-clauses are modifiers to nouns. First,














































‘Lena remembered a funny event (that a cow came to the wash basin and
ate our soap).’
Second, they do not have the morphosyntax that clausal arguments have. Arguments
to DPs in Russian must bear genitive case, and when a CP is an argument of a DP it
has to surface with a genitive form of the demonstrative tot ‘that’ (7).1
1 See Knyazev (2016) for the claim that oblique cases like genitive must be overtly realized in Russian.
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‘aspects of (the fact) that the Hellenistic time began.’




































‘A situation that I sunk my phone happened.’
Finally, modifiers differ from arguments in being able to undergo Late Merge
(Lebeaux 1991). As (9) shows, both Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs can be late-merged to



























‘Nadya1 remembered a rumor /an event that she1 treated the patient who
refused to take medicine yesterday.’
3 JCont-CPK 6= JSit-CPK
If we want CPs to combine with Cont-DPs (10) as modifiers, we cannot treat them
as denoting propositions (1a)=(11). Predicate Modification either will not be able
to combine (10) and (11) due to a type mismatch (if we assume distinct types for
individuals and situations), or will return a wrong meaning—an empty set.
(10) JideaK = {x: x is an idea}
(11) Jthat the squirrels ate the nutsK = {s: the squirrels ate the nuts in s}
Viewing CPs as predicates of things with propositional content (Moltmann 1989,
2014; Kratzer 2006, 2016; Moulton 2009, 2015; Elliott 2017), (1c)=(12), will allow
us to combine embedded clauses with nouns via Predicate Modification (13).
(12) Jthat the squirrels ate the nutsK =
λx ∈ De. Cont(x) = {s: the squirrels ate the nuts in s}
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(13) Jidea that the squirrels ate the nutsK =
λx ∈ De. idea(x) ∧ Cont(x) = {s: the squirrels ate the nuts in s}
The question that arises then is whether (12) can also be the denotation of CPs that
combine with Sit-DPs. I suggest a negative answer to this question. If Sit-CPs
described content, then Sit-DPs would have to denote entities that have content. A
characteristic feature of such entities is their ability to combine with predicates like
‘true’, ‘false’, ‘mistaken’ (Moulton 2009; Elliott 2017; Moltmann 2020). However,

















‘An idea / a situation that reforms are coming is true / mistaken.’
Thus, Sit-DPs do not denote entities with content, and Sit-CPs cannot have the
meaning in (12). In contrast, only Sit-DPs combine with verbs like ‘occur’ and



















‘Yesterday a situation / idea that my order was delayed happened /occurred.’
What we see then is that the embedded proposition can be related to the meaning of
a DP in two different ways. With a Cont-DP, the embedded proposition describes
the propositional content associated with the individual denoted by the DP, whereas
with a Sit-DP, it describes the situation denoted by the DP.
This difference in meaning is further reinforced by another distinction: while
Cont-CPs constitute a referentially opaque domain, Sit-CPs are referentially trans-
parent (Barwise 1981; Higginbotham 1983).2
(16) Lena noticed Cont-DP [CP ..DP.. ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
opaque
(17) Lena noticed Sit-DP [CP ..DP.. ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
transparent
One way to see this distinction is to apply the substitution test. With Cont-DPs like
slux ‘rumor’, from the premises in (18a) and (18b) the conclusion in (18c) does not
follow: one can truthfully assert (18a) and (18b) and negate (18c). If Lena noticed a
2 Cf. also the actuality condition in (Moltmann 2021).
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rumor that this woman arrived on a horse, it doesn’t follow that she noticed a rumor



















































‘Lena noticed a rumor /an event that the queen of G.B. arrived on a horse.’
With Sit-DPs like slučaj ‘event’ on the other hand, the premises in (18a) and (18b)
necessitate the truth of the conclusion in (18c). If Lena noticed an event of this
woman arriving on a horse, then she must have seen an event of the queen arriving
on a horse if this woman is the queen (even if Lena didn’t know this).
Another manifestation of the difference in referential opacity/transparency comes
from the availability of de dicto readings. Because Cont-CPs are referentially opaque,
DPs inside of them can receive both de re and de dicto readings, and thus sentences

























‘A(n) (mistaken) opinion that the sheep on this mountain are goats amused
Andrej.’
Because Sit-CPs are referentially transparent, DPs inside of them lack the ability
to be interpreted de dicto, and thus sentences like (20) are infelicitous under the





















‘A situation that the sheep on this mountain are goats amused Andrej.’
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To sum up, we have seen that CPs that combine with Cont-DPs describe their
propositional content, and these CPs are referentially opaque, whereas CPs that
combine with Sit-DPs describe situations, and these CPs are referentially transparent.
Thus, despite having the same morphosyntactic appearance, Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs
cannot have identical denotations.
4 Proposal
I adopt Kratzer’s (1989; 2020) situation semantics and also assume that situations
form a subset of the indiviuals (Ds ⊂ De).3 I propose that the meaning of čto-clauses
depends on the interpretation of the argument that they modify. The complementizer
čto denotes a function that takes a proposition and an individual x (which could
in principle be a situation) as its arguments, and the conditions for this function
returning 1 or 0 depend on the properties of x (21).
(21) JčtoK = λp ∈ Dst . λx ∈ De.
Cont(x) = p x ∈ dom(Cont)
x exemplifies p x /∈ dom(Cont) ∧ x ∈ Ds
undefined otherwise
In particular, what matters is whether x has propositional content associated with it
or not. I assume that only a subset of the domain of individuals has propositional
content: e.g., individuals like apples and situations like running are not associated
with any propositions, whereas individuals like rumors and situations like thinking
are. We can say that Cont is a partial function from the domain of individuals to the
domain of propositions, and dom(Cont) is the domain of individuals with content.
Then if the second argument of čto is an individual with propositional content,
the condition for the function denoted by čto returning 1 is that the result of applying
the Cont function to x is the embedded proposition (Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2015;
Elliott 2017), which in situation semantics is a set of situations (22).
(22) J[T P belki s”eli orexi]K = {s | the squirrels ate the nuts in s}
If however the second argument of čto is not in the domain of the Cont function,
but it is a situation, then the condition for the function denoted by čto returning 1 is
that x exemplifies the embedded proposition. Exemplification is a relation between a
situation and a proposition with the definition in (23).
(23) Exemplification (based on Kratzer (1989, 2002); Deigan (2020))
s exemplifies p =de f
s ∈ p ∧ (∀s’[s’ @ s⇒ s’ ∈ p] ∨ ∀s’[s’ @ s⇒ s’ /∈ p])
3 This ontological assumption is made, for example, in (Portner 1992).
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A situation s exemplifies a proposition p if p is true in s and the proper parts of s are
homogeneous with respect to p: either in all of them p is true, or in none of them p
is true. This definition allows us to have exemplifying situations for propositions
like There is mud or Achilles is moving, for which it is not clear that there can be a
minimal situation in which they are true.
When the complementizer čto combines with the embedded proposition (by
Functional Application) and with the noun (by Predicate Modification), we get the
following meanings for Cont-DPs and Sit-DPs like in (3) and (4) respectively:
(24) Jmysl’ čto belki s”eli orexiK =
λx. thought(x) ∧ Cont(x)={s’ | the squirrels ate the nuts in s’}
(25) Jslučaj čto belki s”eli orexiK =
λ s. event(s) ∧ s exemplifies {s’ | the squirrels ate the nuts in s’}
In (24) the CP’s meaning is as in (1c), and we get a set of thoughts whose
propositional content is the set of situations in which the squirrels ate the nuts. In
(25) we have a set of situations that are events which exemplify the proposition The
squirrels ate the nuts. Due to situations of the squirrels eating the nuts not being
divisive (their proper parts are not situations of the squirrels eating the nuts), the
denotation of (25) is a set of minimal situations that are events of the squirrels eating
the nuts. Thus, the meaning for the CP in (25) is as in (1b).
4.1 Capturing the observed properties of čto-clauses
Let us consider how the proposed analysis captures the properties of čto-clauses that
we observed in sections 2 and 3. First, on my account CPs are always predicates
of individuals which combine with both Cont-DPs and Sit-DPs by Predicate Modi-
fication. This sits well with the modifier-like syntactic behavior that we observed
in section 2: their optionality, adjunct-like morphosyntax (absence of the genitive
demonstrative), and ability to be late-merged to the nouns they combine with.
Second, according to my proposal čto-clauses do not always describe proposi-
tional content. Thus, they combine with nouns that lack it (predicates of situations).
They also do not always describe situations. Thus, they can occur with more abstract
nouns which are incompatible with predicates like ‘occur’ or ‘happen’.
Finally, in section 3 we saw that Cont-CPs are referentially opaque while Sit-
CPs are referentially transparent. Here is how my proposal predicts this contrast.
Consider first the interpretation that we get for a sentence like in (19):
(26) JAn opinion that the sheep are goats amused AndrejKs0 =
∃s,x [amused(s)(Andrej) ∧ s v s0 ∧ Causer(s) = x ∧ opinion(x)(s0)
∧ Cont(x) = {s’: sheep in s0 are goats in s’}]
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In (19) we are evaluating the sentence with respect to a maximal situation s0 (=
world), and thus the situation of amusement s is part of s0 and the world variable of
the predicate ‘opinion’ is evaluated at s0. The Cont function that comes from the
meaning of the complementizer creates an intensional context, and thus the goathood
in (19) is not evaluated with respect to s0, but with respect to the situations that Cont
returns when applied to the argument x. This of course does not preclude some of
the predicates within the embedded clause—e.g., such as ‘sheep’ in (19)—to be
evaluated at s0. Thus, Cont-CPs constitute a referentially opaque context, in which
de re /de dicto ambiguities are predicted to exist.
Now let us consider Sit-CPs. By definition of exemplification (23), if a situation
s exemplifies p, then s ∈ p. Now consider the semantics we get for the infelicitous
sentence with a Sit-CP in (20) under the assumption that ‘sheep’ is evaluated at s0:
(27) JA situation that the sheep are goats amused AndrejKs0 =
# ∃s,s’ [amused(s)(Andrej) ∧ s v s0 ∧ Causer(s) = s’
∧ situation(s’) ∧ s’ v s0 ∧ s’ exemplifies {s”: sheep in s0 are goats in s”}]
Due to the definition of exemplification, s’ ∈ {s”: sheep in s0 are goats in s”}. The
noun ‘situation’ is not embedded in any intensional context in (27), and so s’ is part
of the situation of evaluation s0: s’ v s0. This implies that not only sheephood, but
also goathood in (20) is evaluated at s0. This means that without further embedding
in an intensional context, de re /de dicto ambiguities will not be possible with Sit-CPs
and they will be referentially transparent, leading to infelicity of sentences like (20)
that require two predicates to be evaluated at different worlds.
The reasoning outlined above also provides an explanation for the fact that the
substitution test fails with Cont-CPs, but succeeds with Sit-CPs (18). The object of a
predicate like ‘notice’ is an actual individual in the world of evaluation s0. Thus, if
the object is a situation s’ v s0, then if s’ is a situation of this woman arriving on a
horse, and in s0 this woman is the queen of Great Britain, then s’ is a situation of
the queen of Great Britain arriving on a horse. Things are different when objects of
verbs like ‘notice’ are individuals like ‘rumor’. The fact that ‘rumor’ is evaluated at
s0 does not tell us anything about how predicates inside of the embedded clause have
to be evaluated, because the Cont function inside Cont-CPs creates an intensional
context. Thus, it is possible to interpret DPs ‘this woman’ and ‘the queen of Great
Britain’ de dicto, and then the substitution test fails: it is consistent to assert both
premises and negate the conclusion.
4.2 Evidence for exemplification
In this section I would like to compare the exemplification semantics for Sit-CPs
that I proposed (21) to an alternative non-minimal semantics for Sit-CPs:
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(28) J[SitCP that the squirrels ate the nuts]K = λ s. the squirrels ate the nuts in s.
The denotation in (28)=(1a) is the denotation of a proposition in situation seman-
tics. The set that the function in (28) characterizes includes situations of different
sizes: minimal situations of the squirrels eating the nuts, whole worlds containing
such situations, as well as many situations of intermediate sizes—e.g., situations
in which the squirrels ate the nuts and the blue jays ate the seeds, but nothing else
happened. The question that arises then is whether we could use (28) instead of the
exemplification semantics. Are there any reasons to use exemplification?
I would like to argue that we need exemplification for the meaning of Sit-CPs.
The first argument in favor of exemplification semantics comes from Sit-DPs that
occur as Causers of emotive states. Consider (29).
(29) Context: Sveta won an award and didn’t thank anyone when receiving it.
















‘A situation that Lena won the award surprised Lena.’
The context of (29) makes a situation in which Sveta won and did not thank
anyone salient, and this situation surprised Sveta. However, the sentence in (29) is
judged false in this scenario: the Sit-DP in this case cannot pick out the situation in
which Sveta won and did not thank anyone. Why cannot it?
Let us consider the predictions that the non-minimal semantics (30) and the
exemplification semantics make, sketched out in (30) and in (31) respectively.
(30) (29) on the non-minimal semantics for Sit-CPs
∃s[situation(s) ∧ surprise(L)(s) ∧s ∈ {s’| S. won an award in s’}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s could be a situation in which Sveta won an award and didn’t thank anyone
(31) (29) on the exemplification semantics for Sit-CPs
∃s[situation(s) ∧ surprise(L)(s) ∧ s exemplifies {s’| S. won an award in s’}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s cannot be a situation in which Sveta won an award and didn’t thank anyone
The non-minimal semantics for Sit-CPs predicts the sentence in (29) to be true in
the provided context (30). There is indeed a situation in which Sveta won an award
that surprised Lena—that is the situation in which Sveta won an award and didn’t
thank anyone. Nothing prevents s in (30) from refering to that situation.
The exemplification semantics for Sit-CPs on the other hand predicts the sen-
tence in (29) to be false. The situation s in which Sveta won an award and didn’t
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thank anyone does not exemplify {s’ | Sveta won an award in s’}. This is so because
s contains both a Sveta-winning-award situation and a Sveta-not-thanking-anyone
situation as its proper parts. This makes s non-homogeneous with respect to the
proposition {s’ | Sveta won an award in s’} (it has proper parts in which the propo-
sition is true, and proper parts in which it is false), and thus by the definition of
exemplification in (23) s does not qualify as this proposition’s exemplifier. And given
that in the provided context Lena was not surprised by a situation that exemplifies
Sveta winning an award (she was only surprised by a bigger situation that contains
it), (29) is correctly predicted to be false.
Thus, the exemplification semantics has advantage over the non-minimal seman-
tics in being able to capture the interpretation of sentences like (29). The second
argument in favor of exemplification comes from the ban on stacking. Modifiers of



















‘a situation, in which Mitya played a piano, in which Nastya sang’
This is unexpected under the non-minimal semantics for Sit-CPs: nothing pre-
vents several CPs from combining with the noun by Predicate Modification and
shrinking the set of situations in the predicate a bit (33).
(33) λ s. situation(s) ∧Mitya played a piano in s ∧ Nastya sang in s
The ban on stacking is however predicted by the exemplification semantics.
There can be no single situation that exemplifies both {s’: Mitya played a piano in
s’} and {s’: Nastya sang in s’}, and thus the meaning of stacked Sit-CPs will always
result in an empty set (34), which I assume is the cause of the ungrammaticality.4
(34) λ s. situation(s) ∧ s exemplifies {s’: Mitya played a piano in s’}
∧ s exemplifies {s’: Nastya sang in s’} = /0
One more argument in favor of exemplification comes from the ban on modifying
deverbal nouns. It is plausible to think that deverbal nouns like kormlenie životnyx
‘feeding of animals’ denote predicates of situations, and thus we might expect Sit-
CPs to combine with them by Predicate Modification. However, this does not seem
to be possible: a relative clause needs to be used instead of a čto-clause to convey
the desired meaning, (35)-(36).
4 The exemplification semantics however does not exclude stacking of Sit-CPs with completely identical
propositions in them (situation that p that p). I have to assume that some independent constraint on
redundancy rules out those cases as ungrammatical.
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‘feeding of the animals in which the squirrels ate the nuts’
I would like to suggest that this contrast can be understood if we assume that deverbal
nominals are predicates of situations that exemplify the underlying proposition:
(37) Jfeeding animalsK = λ s. s exemplifies {s’: s’ is a feeding of animals}
If (37) is correct, then exemplification semantics predicts (35) to be ungrammat-
ical for the same reason that stacking CPs is disallowed: intersecting two sets of
situations which exemplify different propositions is impossible (38).
(38) (35) on the exemplification semantics for Sit-CPs
Jfeeding animals that the squirrels ate the nutsK = λ s. s exemplifies {s’: s’ is
a feeding of animals} ∧ s exemplifies {s’: the squirrels ate the nuts in s’}=/0
Any situation that exemplifies the squirrels eating the nuts doesn’t include any
feeding. And feeding is included in all situations that exemplify feeding animals,
and thus (38) is always an empty set, hence the ungrammaticality of (35).
The non-minimal semantics on the other hand incorrectly predicts a reasonable
meaning for (35): the set of exemplifying animal-feeding situations is just further
restricted to the ones in which the squirrels eat nuts (39).
(39) (35) on the non-minimal semantics for Sit-CPs
Jfeeding animals that the squirrels ate the nutsK = λ s. s exemplifies
{s’: s’ is a feeding of animals} ∧ the squirrels ate the nuts in s
The grammaticality of (36) suggests that relativization differs from complemen-
tation in that it does not involve exemplification. Thus, while the semantics in (39)
is incorrect for the attempts to combine deverbal nouns with čto-clauses, it might be
exactly right for cases where deverbal nouns are modified by relative clauses (36).
To sum up, in this section I argued that when čto-clauses combine with nouns,
their meaning is sensitive to the meaning of the noun that they modify: they describe
the propositional content of the nominal argument when they combine with Cont-
DPs, and they specify the proposition that the situation exemplifies when they
combine with Sit-DPs. This accounts for the properties in which Cont-CPs and Sit-
CPs differ, e.g., while the former are referentially opaque, the latter are transparent.
In the next two sections I will show that čto-clauses lead the same dual life when
they combine with verbs, and that we might be able to decompose the disjunctive
meaning for the complementizer in (21) into two separate pieces.
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5 Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs with verbs
We have only seen evidence for distinguishing Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs for the clauses
that combine with nouns, but there are also reasons to believe that the same two
meanings of CPs are attested when clauses combine with verbs.
CPs that combine with verbs have been analyzed as predicates of contentful
entities in the literature: sometimes as modifiers of internal arguments of verbs
(Kratzer 2006, 2016; Moulton 2015), sometimes as modifiers of event arguments
(Bogal-Allbritten 2016, 2017; Elliott 2017). CPs that combine with verbs like dumat’
‘think’, somnevatsja ‘doubt’ or predpolagat’ ‘assume’ are Cont-CPs: they describe
the propositional content associated with some contentful individual (e.g., thought)
or state (e.g., state of thinking), and are referentially opaque, as is illustrated by the

















‘Masha thinks /doubts /assumes that the sheep are goats.’
But there are also verbs that take Sit-CPs. In Russian these are verbs like byvat’
‘happen’, slučatsja ‘occur’, proisxodit’ ‘take place’. When CPs combine with
these verbs, they describe situations that happen /occur /take place. These CPs are
referentially transparent. In (41) we see that the sentence that requires the predicate
‘goats’ within the embedded clause to be interpreted de dicto is infelicitous with

















lit. ‘It happens /occured /took place that sheep are goats.’
(42) shows that the substitution test succeeds with these CPs: if situations of this
woman riding on a horse happen in the world of evaluation s0, then provided this
woman is the queen of Great Britain in s0, it follows that situations of the queen of


























‘This woman is the queen of Great Britain.’
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‘It happens that the queen of G.B. rides a horse.’
Thus, we see that with verbs as well as with nouns, the interpretation of the
čto-clause depends on what it combines with. If we think that čto-clauses modify an
argument of the verb, then we can assume that whether they will be interpreted as
Cont-CPs or Sit-CPs depends on the properties of the verb’s argument—on whether
it is an entity in the domain of the Cont function, or a situation that’s not.
Russian has an additional morphosyntactic diagnostic for distinguishing Cont-
CPs from Sit-CPs with verbs which tracks the distinction in referential transparency:




































‘Masha thinks /doubts that the squirrels ate all the nuts.’
We have seen that there are verbs like dumat’ ‘think’ that select for Cont-CPs
and verbs like slučatsja ‘occur’ that select for Sit-CPs, which raises the question
of whether there are verbs that admit CPs with both interpretations. I would like
to suggest that verbs like pomnit’ ‘remember’, zamečat’ ‘notice’, videt’ ‘see’ are
such verbs, although the distinction is harder to see due to their (semi-)factivity.
These verbs can combine with takoe ‘such’ (45), and when they do, direct perception















‘Lena remembers M.’s smoking.’ ⇒ Lena directly perceived M. smoking.
We can think of (45) as ‘remember’ combining with a Sit-CP: a situation that
exemplifies {s’: Mitya smokes in s’} is what is remembered by Lena. Without































‘Lena remembers the fact that Mitya smoked, despite not seeing him smoke
even once.’ ; Lena directly perceived Mitya smoking.
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We can think of (46) as ‘remember’ combining with a Cont-CP: the fact or claim
x whose content is the proposition {s’: Mitya smokes in s’} is what is remembered
by Lena. In this case there doesn’t have to be any direct relation between Lena and a
situation of Mitya smoking.5
To sum up, CPs that combine with verbs differ in their interpretation, and these
differences can be viewed as stemming from the restrictions that verbs place on the
arguments that CPs modify. Some verbs (like dumant’ ‘think’) require that their
arguments are in dom(Cont), others (like slučatsja ‘occur’) take situations as their
arguments, and there are also verbs (like pomnit’ ‘remember’) which do not place
any restrictions and thus can combine with both Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs.
6 Comparison with Korean: an argument for decomposition
The meaning for the complementizer that I proposed in (21) is disjunctive in nature,
which raises the questions of whether it is possible to dissociate the introduction
of the Content function from the rest of the lexical entry, and whether there is any
evidence for such a decomposition. Here is how the decomposition could look like.
It could be the case that the structure of Cont-CPs contains a phonologically null












Then if we assume that exemplification is defined not only for situations, but for
all individuals, we can attribute Cont and COMP the meanings in (49) and (50).
(49) JContK = λpst .λxe. Content(x) = p
(50) JCOMPK = λpet .λxe. x exemplifies p
The denotation of the Cont-DP in (3), for example, then will be as in (51): a set
of individuals that are thoughts and which exemplify the predicate of individuals
with propositional content {s’ | squirrels ate the nuts in s’}.
5 This account predicts that verbs like pomnit’ ‘remember’ should be referentially transparent if the
clause they combine with is understood as a Sit-CP, but referentially opaque if the clause they combine
with is interpreted as a Cont-CP. I leave testing this prediction for the future.
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(51) Jmysl’ [čto CONT belki s”eli vse orexi]K = λx. thought(x) ∧ x exemplifies
{y | Cont(y)={s’ | the squirrels ate all the nuts in s’}}
This differs from the previous semantics in (24) only in the addition of the
exemplification requirement, which does not contribute anything, but as far as I can
tell is harmless.6 The denotation of the Sit-DP in (4) will be as in (52), which is
exactly the meaning we had before (25).
(52) Jslučaj [čto belki s”eli vse orexi]K =
λ s. event(s) ∧ s exemplifies {s’ | the squirrels ate all the nuts in s’}
Having seen that decomposition is in principle possible, we can now ask whether
there is any empirical evidence for it actually taking place. While I have not been
able to find such evidence within Russian, Korean seems to provide support for the
decompositional analysis. Both Cont-CPs and Sit-CPs that combine with nouns in
Korean are clauses with the so-called adnominal marker -(n)un (see Kim 2009, Lee
2019, a.o., for discussion of these clauses in other constructions). However, the two
types of clauses differ in their internal structure: the so-called declarative marker -ta






















‘The situation that Swuna solved the problem is interesting.’
We can hypothesize then that Korean allows us to see the underlying structure:
perhaps Korean declarative marker -ta is the spell-out of the Cont head and the
adnominal marker -(n)un is the exponent corresponding to COMP:8
6 But it has an interesting consequence: for an individual x with propositional content p it is required
that either no proper parts of x also have content p, or that all proper parts of x have content p. More
research into the mereological structure of contentful individuals is required to test this prediction.
7 There is another difference between them: in (53) we see the past tense marker -ess that is absent
in (54). However, this restriction on the presence of -ess is not absolute: for example, -ess is able
to occur in the first conjunct if two propositions are conjoined (by conjunction ko) under a Sit-DP.
Further research is necessary to determine the distribution of -ess in these clauses.












This analysis makes the following prediction. If it is -ta that creates an intensional
context, Cont-CPs should be referentially opaque in Korean, and Sit-CPs should be













































‘Mina remembered the claim that the tallest girl in the class solved the
problem.’
In (57) we see that Cont-CPs are referentially opaque: from the premises in (57a)
and (57b) the conclusion in (57c) does not follow. (58) shows that the substitution
test succeeds with Sit-DPs like sanghwang ‘situation’: if Mina remembers the
situation of Swuna solving the problem, then she remembers the situation of the
























‘Swuna is the tallest girl in the class.’
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‘Mina remembers that the tallest girl in the class solved the problem.’
Thus, Korean allows us to conclude that different functional pieces are responsi-
ble for introducing the Cont function (Cont) and for establishing an exemplification
relation (COMP). While the Cont head might lack an overt exponent in some lan-
guages (Russian), Korean provides us evidence for its existence.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper I argued that finite embedded clauses can have two distinct meanings:
they can either denote sets of individuals whose propositional content equals the
embedded proposition (Cont-CPs) or sets of situations that exemplify the embed-
ded proposition (Sit-CPs). While Cont-CPs create an intentional context (and are
thus opaque), Sit-CPs are referentially transparent. Both types of CPs can look
morphosyntactically the same in a given language (Russian), but data from Korean
suggests that their functional make-up is not the same: while both CPs have a
complementizer (COMP) that introduces the exemplification relation, only Cont-CPs
have a functional head (Cont) that introduces the Content relation.
Here are some implications of this proposal. First, it provides further support
for theories of clausal embedding that treat embedded CPs as modifiers rather than
arguments (Kratzer 2006; Moulton 2015; Elliott 2017). Second, a consequence
of this proposal is that not all finite embedded clauses create intensional contexts.
Finally, data from Korean suggests that it’s not complementizers, but a functional
element lower in the left periphery that is the source of the Content function.
One open question that remains is how much variation we find in whether
embedded clauses can occur with Sit-DPs, and what drives such variation. For
example, many English speakers find that-clauses to be quite odd with nouns like
situation (although some naturally occuring examples can be found, e.g. (59)), and
prefer to use in which-clauses or where-clauses instead.
(59) It is [a curious situation that the sea, from which life first arose should now
be threatened by the activities of one form of that life].9
What is the cause of this restriction? One hypothesis that could be investigated is
that while that-clauses could in principle modify Sit-DPs, they compete with other
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